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WHAT IS WRONG WITH EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY? LESSONS FROM
ART. 8 TEU IN APPROACHING ITS REFORM
Preliminary remarks1.
On 4th March 2015, the European Commission and the High Representative Mogherini issued a joint
consultation paper titled “Towards a new European Neighbourhood policy”. The document aims at
putting the frame of a debate among EU institutions, partners, civil society and member States on the
direction the EU neighbourhood policy shall  take in the years to come. The review document is
expected in  mid-November  this  year  and will  take into  consideration the outcome of  the public
consultation held until 30th June 2015 (now closed). Interestingly enough, if we compare the response
rate to this public consultation with the response rate to another one launched one year before by the
European Commission on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement, participation is comparatively “poor” this
time, with around 150 replies to the former vis-à-vis 150.000 to the latter. Despite the limited interest of
 the general public, the policy at stake has a considerable impact on a series of aspects of our day-by-
day life, such as migration, stability and exchanges in general with third Countries in our vicinity.
Undoubtedly,  the  turmoil  experienced  in  the  recent  years  both  in  the  Southern  and  Eastern
neighbourhood complicated considerably EU attempts to deliver on this policy. The presence of strong
third actors in  the neighbours’  geo-political  space (the so called “neighbour of  neighbours”)  has
challenged EU “transformative dream”, highlighting the weaknesses of an approach merely based on
“soft” power. Also, aspirations of neighbouring countries have changed throughout time, requiring the
EU to offer new and differentiated “products” to its partners. Products that the complexities of EU
decision-making process,  the lack of  shared political  vision among the member States,  and the
absence  of  flexible  EU  foreign  policy  tools  have  struggled  to  yield.  These  flaws  pervade  the
consultation paper, as a sort of “mea culpa”, and are particularly vibrant in one of the first questions
the Commission and the High Representative ask the public: “should the ENP be maintained?”. The
argument is submitted here that EU needs its neighbourhood policy now more than ever. This was
also the overwhelming response of the public to the consultation paper. An attempt should therefore
be made to convert it into something different. The EU may hide some harrows in its… Treaties.
 The EU neighbourhood: geographical scope and geo-political concepts2.
The ENP was launched through a soft law document of the Commission, namely the Communication
COM(2003)104 ‘Wider Europe’. The document, designed as a complement of the so called “big-bang
enlargement” of 2004, provided the first conceptual framework to bring under a common hat – rectius
a common policy – the relations with third countries sharing geographical proximity with the (then)
newly established EU external borders. More precisely, the new “policy” was conceived to strengthen
the framework for  the Union’s relations with those neighbouring countries that  did not  have the
perspective of EU membership, at least in the medium term. Candidate countries such as Turkey,
Romania and Bulgaria, or the Western Balkans countries were thus excluded from its geographical
scope, as their relations with the EU were on a different path. Conversely, the Commission expressly
endorsed the relations with both the Southern Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon,  Libya,  Morocco,  Palestinian Authority,  Syria,  Tunisia)  and Western Newly Independent
States (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova). Southern Caucasus countries (Armenia, Georgia, Arzebaijan)
were originally left out of the initiative, due to their location, but eventually included in 2004. Russia,
instead, refused to be part  of  the ENP, despite its initial  inclusion among the “target”  countries.
Russia’s reticence was based on its conviction to represent a self-sufficient pole of attraction and
influence in the European continent,  able to maintain with EU a relationship based on equality,
partnership and non-interference. This attitude seems to contain the seeds of the hurdles EU is
meeting in the realization of ENP today (see below, §§ 2 and 3). At the time, however, cooperation
with Southern countries was more developed than with the Eastern ones, due to the regional initiative
of the Barcelona Process already started in 1995. Nevertheless, after the 2004 enlargement, Eastern
partners started to show more aspirations to cooperate with the EU. Today, association agreements
establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (“DCFTA”) concluded with countries such as
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, together with the regional initiative of the Eastern Partnership, show a
more advanced integration in the East. In this regard, ENP was successful in avoiding dividing lines
within  Europe,  namely  between those  countries  that  had  just  become members  as  a  result  of
enlargement, and their Eastern neighbours, remained outside the membership process. The idea was
to develop a zone of prosperity around Europe, based on friendly, peaceful and co-operative relations
with neighbouring countries (a “ring of friends” of the EU). It was believed that enhanced political and
economic interdependence could by itself promote stability, security and sustainable development
both within and outside the EU. Progressive economic and political integration of such countries was
to be achieved through their  commitment to common values and the implementation of political,
economic and institutional reforms based on EU acquis.  The policy was built  on what has been
defined a “constructive ambiguity”, namely that of “using the transformative power Europe without
explicitly offering the big prize: membership” (Speech by Commissioner for European Neighbourhood
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, on 17 September 2015, College of Europe,
Bruges). It should be said that ENP was not taking place in a legal vacuum. EU already had a series
of international agreements in place with some of the partners, whether association, partnership or
trade agreements, establishing differing degrees of cooperation. Such existing tools remained at the
base of the neighbourhood relationship and evolved with it. They were re-oriented and strengthened
within a wider political framework, designed by Country or regional Action Plans agreed with the
interested partners i.e. political documents setting out the strategic policy targets and benchmarks to
be reached by the third Country under the “supervision” of the EU. A “conditionality ” approach (or
“more for more” approach) underpinned EU action in this field: the more a Country would undertake
reforms towards democracy, human rights and rule of law, the more funding (under relevant EU
financial instruments), access to visa and trade liberalization it would get in return from the EU (on the
combination of soft and hard law tools in the policy at stake, C. Hillion, The EU’s Neighbourhood
Policy towards Eastern Europe, in A. Dashwood, M. Marescau (eds.), Law and practice of EU external
relations, 2008, p. 324 e ss.; Id., Institutional aspects for the partnership between the European Union
and the newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, in Common Market Law Review, 2000,
p. 1219; B. Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy, New
York, 2012, pp. 179-2011). In the long run, to quote a famous formula of President Prodi, these
Countries would share with EU members “everything but institutions”, on the model of the European
Economic Area. Indeed, the geo-political concept behind the new foreign policy tool elaborated by the
Commission was based on the assumption that neighbouring countries were willing to conduct reforms
in exchange of closer integration to the EU.
 Reviewing ENP and the 2015 consultation paper3.
ENP initiatives allowed the EU to develop stronger relationships with partners in a wide range of
cooperation fields,  from energy to  education,  from transport  to  research.  ENP content  has also
significantly deepened in some areas, offering to third countries the opportunity to establish DCFTAs,
mobility partnerships and visa free regimes. However, the idea of EU support to political reforms in
neighbouring Countries, to the benefit of stability in the region, conveyed limited results. The recent
events regarding the Arab Spring, the instability in the Middle East, the continuing repressions in
Belarus as well as the Ukrainian crisis show the difficulties of delivering on political improvements in a
neighbourhood  facing  rapid  changes.  This  is  why  in  2011,  the  High  Representative  and  the
Commission  issued  a  Joint  Communication  –  A  new  response  to  a  changing  neighbourhood,
COM(2011)303,  calling  for  a  more responsive,  flexible  and tailored ENP.  The review document
anticipated some aspects of the deeper reform process started with the consultation paper of March
2015. The building blocks on which this reform shall be articulated are listed in the same consultation
paper and deserve some attention.
In the first place, reference is made to greater differentiation with individual partners. Indeed, the
assumption that all the neighbouring countries were willing to have the same level of integration with
the EU has proved to be false. Although awareness of the different starting conditions of each Country
was already present at the origin of ENP, the idea that the same integration opportunities and pre-
established targets of reforms should be offered to all the partners led to a biased relationship, in
which partners pretended to reform and EU pretended to believe them (Speech by Commissioner for
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, above). The reality
is that costs arising in the short term as a result of partnership with EU, together with the strategic
interests of each Country, determine different sovereign choices with regard to the level of integration
they are willing to establish with the EU. A more tailored relationship would allow the EU to induce
partners to work on selected priorities they are genuinely willing to carry out.
The second point envisaged in the consultation paper is a sharper focus on areas of interest for the
EU. This entails for the EU to carry out a more strategic preparatory work, in order to approach
negotiations with a clear idea of what its priorities are in a given Country. The consultation paper spots
out some proposals in this regard. However, it  is here submitted that such areas of interest and
priorities can change over time, depending on endogenous as much as exogenous factors. Moreover,
EU priorities should adjust depending on what each Country is able and willing to offer:  energy
security,  cooperation  on  migration  fluxes,  transportation  networks,  defense  assistance,  security
dialogue, fight against organizational crime, etc. In this context, a permanent and genuine diplomatic
dialogue seems needed, in order for ENP to result flexible and responsive, and to avoid that such
instrument becomes an empty box.
Flexibility  is  indeed the third challenge mentioned in the consultation paper,  what entails  also a
capacity to react to emergencies arising in the neighbouring countries, overcoming the complexities of
EU decision making processes. In this respect, new financial tools can be created to support a more
responsive political action.
The last pillar of reform is ownership and visibility. The idea is that partner Countries would feel more
engaged in the neighbouring relationship if they perceive to be treated as equals and communities are
aware of the aims and impact of this policy. Furthermore, as the Ukrainian crisis has thought, the EU is
not alone in the relationship with neighbours, and “neighbours of neighbous” need to be taken into
account when dialoguing with interested countries. At the same time, competing integration processes
exist, such as the recently established Eurasian Economic Union (funded in 2014 between Russian
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) that may overlap with EU scope of action
(see, on each point, also the European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the review of the
European Neighbourhood Policy).
 The need to explore further the potential of the Lisbon normative shift4.
Without guessing on the content of the review document that shall be published later this year, let us
draw some considerations on the legal framework within which the reform shall take place. The Lisbon
Treaty introduced for the first time a legal basis for ENP in art. 8 TEU, according to which “[t]he Union
shall  develop a  special  relationship  with  neighbouring  countries,  aiming to  establish  an area of
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close
and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. The wording of the provision not only codifies existing
practice, but seems to incorporate a change of approach at primary law level: on the one hand, the
verb “shall” suggests that the EU is bound to engage with neighbouring countries, with a specific view
to protect its own interests in the stability around its borders. More precisely, the Union should develop
peaceful cooperation relations based on its own values. The reference to the “values of the Union”,
and not to “shared” or “common values”, referred to in the early documents regarding ENP, supports
the functional relationship between the policy at stake and the interests of the Union. The importance
to pursue EU interests in its relations with the rest of the world is also mandated by art. 3.5 TEU. On
the contrary, compliance with certain legal, political and economic standards on the side of partners
seems not a prerequisite of EU engagement in the neighbourhood. In other words, as it has been
suggested, the Union should not wait that third Countries comply with human rights, democracy and
rule of law before engaging with them. Rather, the EU interest in stability should be pursued in the first
place, a special relationship based on EU values being the means to reach such goal (C. Hillion, The
EU neighbourhood competence under art. 8 TEU, in Notre Europe Policy Paper no. 69/2013; contra,
D. Hanf, The ENP in the light of the new “neighbourhood clause” (Article 8 TEU), in College of Europe,
Research Paper in Law – Cahiers juridiques, No. 2/2011; P. Van Elsuwege, R. Petrov, Article 8 TEU:
Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Countries of the European Union?, in European
Law Review, 2011, p. 688). What follows is that a “catch all” approach based on a wide range of
political and legal reforms as a precondition to partnership, similar to that pursued on the model of
enlargement practice, seems not required nor necessary in the implementation of the policy at stake,
although conditionality method is not excluded. In order to deliver in accordance with the Treaty
mandate, focus should rather be put on selected priorities reflecting EU interests in stability.
The above reading of  the provision seems further confirmed by the location of  art.  8 within the
“Common Provisions” of TEU. It is not related to the enlargement provision (art. 49 TEU), nor is it
included in the specific sections of the Treaties relating to the external action of the Union, namely
Title V TEU, and Part V TFEU. As a consequence, ENP qualifies as a structural element of the EU, a
necessary tool for its … peaceful existence. In order to be effective, ENP is designed as an inter-treaty
(formerly inter-pillar) legal basis, involving as much TFEU competences (e.g. migration, development,
energy, transport, environment, free movement of persons, trade) as CFSP competences (e.g. political
dialogue, security and defense). In this perspective, its location outside of Title V TEU regarding
specific provisions on CFSP allows art. 8 TEU to operate regardless of the limits imposed by art. 40
TEU (see ECJ, C-91/05, Commission v. Council (ECOWAS) ECR [2008] I-3651). This means that the
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty required the integration of political and defense goals into ENP, as
opposed to the initial idea, inspired to Jean Monnet’s and Robert Shuman’s philosophy, of crafting a
tool of merely technical cooperation. It is true that, in some cases, the technical approach allows
cooperation to take place irrespective of political deadlocks. However, the limits of this method are
clear in the escalation of political tensions surrounding European external borders. EU needs to use its
toolbox in a smarter and more effective way. This is particularly relevant with regard to the scope of
“neighbourhood” agreements with the countries concerned that could in principle replace existing
agreements in accordance with art. 8.2. TEU. But not only. Also unilateral measures aimed to support
reforms or address emergencies in the neighbouring countries could be adopted on the grounds of art.
8 TFEU, endorsing all the sectors necessary to pursue EU stability objectives, whether they belong to
CFSP, CSDP or TFEU competences.
Despite the significant normative shift introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, practice has shown some legal
and political hurdles in the use of art. 8 TEU as a legal basis for EU action towards its neighbours. For
example, the recently signed association agreements with Ukraine (followed by those with Moldova
and Georgia) were concluded on grounds of traditional legal basis such as art. 217 and 218 TFEU,
despite  their  clear  “neighbourhood”  context  (on  complexities  regarding  the  legal  basis  of  such
agreements,  see  G.  Van  Der  Loo,  P.  Van  Elsuwege,  R.  Petrov,  The  EU-Ukraine  Association
Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument, EUI Working Paper n. 2014/9, p. 8). If this
can be partly due to some ambiguities that still surround the procedures applying to art. 8 TEU (A.
Lang, Art. 8 TUE, in F. Pocar, M. C. Baruffi (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione
europea, p. 48; G. Strozzi, Art. 8 TUE, in A. Tizzano (a cura di), Trattati dell’Unione europea, p. 83), a
decisive factor in the exclusion of art. 8 TEU as the legal basis of the agreements was the refusal of
the interested countries to be put under the framework of  “good neighbourliness”,  based on the
argument  that  they  wanted  a  clear  recognition  as  part  of  Europe  and  not  of  the  European
neighbourhood.  In  this  respect,  countries  that  have  today  stronger  European  aspirations  might
perceive neighbourhood as a non-including process, a space where minor partners are placed. At the
same  time,  some  Sourthern  partners  have  recently  shown  little  interest  in  committing  to  legal
approximation and comprehensive integration with the EU in line with ENP targets.
In this respect, it seems clear that the advocated change of approach in the implementation of ENP is
needed in order to avoid that this innovative legal base remains a “dead” provision. Different levels of
integration should be made available to the different partners,  depending on their  aspirations.  A
“variable geometry” ENP seems fully compatible with art. 8 TEU, if not mandated by it. Association
and other kind of agreements can still coexist with ENP. However, an effort should be made to clarify
the goals and advantages of ENP agreements to third countries, provided that membership (art. 49
TEU) is not per se excluded by neighbourhood. On the other hand, conditionality should not be a
barrier to access of third countries to neighbourhood relationship, but should be maintained as a tool
for ensuring that the agreed priorities are met. Provided that the strongest economic and political
support must be ensured to countries that wish to align closer, a shift form a donor to an investment
dynamic would probably help the EU to make partnership more interesting for those countries not
willing to engage in deep integration processes. If a more “self-interested” approach is followed by the
EU, in the spirit of art. 8 TFEU, it is possible that also some types of reticence from third Countries
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